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This is the next and the more profound stage of the
battle for civil rights… We seek not just legal equity but
human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory
but equality as a fact and equality as a result –
President Johnson, “To Fulfill These Rights,” June 4,
1965. 1

Twelve years after the ratification of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 [VRA], Richmond, Virginia elected a historic majority
black city council. The 5-4 majority quickly appointed an African
American lawyer named Henry Marsh, III to the mayoralty.
Marsh, a nationally celebrated civil rights litigator, was not only
the city’s first black mayor, but the council election of 1977 was
also Richmond’s first since 1970. 2 In 1972, a federal district
court used the VRA’s preclearance clause in Section 5 to place a
moratorium on council contests. 3 This moratorium lasted until
the Supreme Court and the Department of Justice determined
whether Richmond’s 1970 annexation of portions of Chesterfield
County had diluted the black electorate’s power by adding nearly
44,000 white suburban residents. 4 While the high Court upheld
the capital city’s boundary expansion, it demanded in return that
Richmonders abandon at-large elections and implement an
electoral system that allowed African Americans, who
represented more than 50 percent of Richmond’s population
prior to annexation, to vote within almost exclusively black
districts. Districts immediately led to the election of Richmond’s
majority-black city council. By the mid-1970s, these majorityminority districts demonstrated that national officials (liberals
and conservatives alike) planned to defend the “equality of
results” standard Johnson articulated at Howard University in
1965. 5
By illustrating Richmonders’ drive for an unimpeded vote
and Washington’s defense of the VRA, this article outlines how

local people influenced national voting rights policy. Much has
been made of Southern African Americans’ appeals to political
empowerment and the ways whites parried these appeals after
the VRA’s ratification. Scholars contend that 1965 was the
beginning of a complex, policy-oriented era in America’s struggle
for racial equality. 6 Yet, the solutions Washington devised (e.g.,
racial redistricting) to prevent resistance to the VRA had
unintended consequences for local Southern politics. 7 Historians,
beginning with Steven Lawson (and, later, Hugh Davis Graham),
have spent decades interrogating developments in voting right
after 1965. 8 Lawson and Graham not only demonstrated how
Washington policy elites actually ratified civil rights legislation,
they also showed that policymakers defended the civil rights
bills beyond 1965. 9 A number of relatively recent studies by
scholars such as Morgan Kousser and Richard Valelly place the
electoral reforms of the 1960s within the larger context of
American political development—both trace the contention over
suffrage expansion from the Reconstruction amendments to the
civil rights movement and beyond. 10 These efforts contend that
while institutional political stability in Washington (particularly
congress and the courts) was critical to the initial preservation of
the Second Reconstruction, whites continued to resist blacks’
appeals for political parity. Frank Parker’s Black Votes Count,
which highlighted Mississippi’s local voting rights struggles after
1965, was one of the first endeavors to specifically underscore
how the dialectic between local black suffragists and white
detractors influenced the VRA’s development. 11 By focusing on
the border South, this effort also demonstrates that local
Southerners, not merely national policy elites, were central to
the creation of district systems. 12
Realizing the rights embodied in the VRA cannot be
explained by separating local minority mobilization on one hand
and federal policy directed toward race on the other. Southern
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localities became seedbeds for voting rights litigation during the
1960s and this litigation often supplanted direct-action protests
and civil disobedience strategies. Everyday people not only
helped instigate this litigation, they were responding to a brand
of white recalcitrance that rivaled massive resistance to public
school integration in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education
(1954). 13 As it happened, whites were just as skeptical about the
rise of blacks in politics as they were about blacks attending
segregated schools. And when it came to combatting this
backlash, it turned out that history mattered. Richmond’s black
voters were effectively organized under the Richmond Crusade
for Voters (the Crusade or RCV) nearly a decade prior to 1965. In
Richmond, where blacks made up nearly 50 percent of the
capital city’s population during the 1960s, the VRA re-energized
an already organized black electorate—it also calcified white
resistance. Although blacks made up 42 percent of Richmond’s
population after annexation, the city elected only one African
American councilperson, Henry Marsh, to its nine-member
council in 1970. 14
Washington’s suspension of Richmond’s city council
elections typified a growing problem after the VRA’s
ratification—Southern anxiety about black governance led to
widespread vote dilution. As African Americans began to vote in
record numbers after 1965, the process of diminishing
minorities’ political power—in this case, weakening a group’s
ability to elect candidates of their choice— gained new
momentum. 15 In 1968, federal investigators noticed that African
Americans exercised a “tyranny over the mind of the white
South, which has found continuous expression in the politics of
the region.” 16 Richmond’s elites, who embraced segregation but
rejected maintaining the color line through violence, sustained
their longstanding skepticism of open democracy by enacting
poll taxes. 17 These powerbrokers not only believed—like their

Southern counterparts—that African Americans lacked the
intellectual capacity for politics, they used poll taxes to affirm the
notion that good government was synonymous with elite
whiteness. 18 As Richmond’s African Americans began to register
in higher numbers than whites and, occasionally, elect African
American officials in the 1960s, white councilmembers carried
on the politics of elitism— they enacted a series of ostensibly
color-blind initiatives that made it increasingly difficult for
blacks to elect more than a handful of public officials. 19 While
this process of cancelling out black votes happened throughout
the South, Richmond’s whites publically maintained that these
political directives were meant to maintain the integrity of
political continuity. In actuality, whites designed these policies,
which culminated in annexation, to ensure a white majority on
Richmond’s city council. Richmond’s Mayor Phil Bagley, the
architect of Chesterfield annexation, privately contended, “I did
what I did in reference to the compromise [annexation] because
the niggers are not qualified to run the city of Richmond.” 20
These powerbrokers, who were unwilling to let go of the
entrenched political privileges segregation engendered,
eventually met firm resistance in Richmond and Washington. 21
Richmonders, led by civic activist Curtis Holt and a core
group of white suburbanites (who were trying to preclude public
school integration), brought a series of de-annexation suits
against Richmond. These suits plugged the former capital of the
Confederacy into the circuitry of a litigation-based voting rights
revolution. This so-called reapportionment revolution went
beyond safeguarding access to the suffrage; it also protected a
minority group’s right to elect preferred representatives in a
manner that was commensurate with their total voting-age
population. 22 Although Nixon’s administration initially
attempted to defang the VRA’s Sections 4 and 5 (in large part to
win the favor of the South’s emergent Republican constituency),
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the Burger Court and John Mitchell’s Department of Justice
became unlikely allies in the process of strengthening the VRA. 23
As anti-dilution cases inundated Washington after 1965, the
Court acknowledged that the discriminatory effect of electoral
laws mattered just as much as discriminatory intent. The Burger
Court, which recognized that resistance to the VRA might be
characterized as anti-democratic, eventually parlayed an
employment-based affirmative action remedy known as
“disparate impact analysis” (established to defend proportional
representation in workplaces) to achieve equal representation. 24
Justices held that facially neutral actions could have
disproportionate and disparate impacts on minorities. In terms
of voting rights, the Court applied this logic to policies that
allowed blacks to vote, but diluted the impact of those votes. 25
In Richmond’s case, it took local and federal officials nearly five
years to chew through three cases that interrogated the nature of
Chesterfield County’s annexation. 26 The Court held that
annexation strengthened whites’ voting power by diminishing
the number of Richmond’s black inhabitants and, as such, African
Americans had less opportunity to elect preferred candidates. 27
In lieu of returning Chesterfield County, justices expressed a
growing preference for implementing majority-minority
districts—these districts, in terms of American political
development, finally instigated a durable shift in redistributing
Southern political authority along racial lines. 28
By following black voter mobilization to its logical
conclusion, black empowerment and governance, this story
complements current endeavors to expand the civil rights
movement’s chronology. This essay, like a growing body of
literature on the movement’s timeline, explains civil rights
policies that played out far from the movement’s direct action
tactics. 29 Recently, much has been made of the fight for civil
rights prior to the 1950s and the organizing strategies civil rights

advocates devised prior to Brown. 30 We now know that during
the Montgomery to Selma era in civil rights, the so-called
“classical phase,” African Americans fought against
institutionalized racism by tapping the wellspring of previous
organizing traditions and activating the machinery of black
churches. 31 We also know a great deal more about the
significance of whites’ reaction to this movement and the
subsequent ratification of the civil rights bills. 32 While the VRA
gave rise to dramatic changes in Southern politics, it fell short of
eliminating, according to Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, “all vestiges of discrimination against the exercise of
the franchise by minority citizens.” 33 While this story illustrates
how local people and the federal government pushed the rights
revolution well into the 1970s, it is also a cautionary account of
the political abuses that often follow American electoral
reforms. 34 After 1965, African Americans defended the value of
their hard-won right to vote and insisted that their votes
mattered by working quietly within the democratic system. 35 In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, a deluge of litigation (more than
50 cases) concerning vote dilution inundated state and federal
court systems. 36 This litigation (after Congress’s renewal of the
VRA in 1970) sought to neutralize structural barriers (e.g.,
annexations) that, on their face, denied no one the right to vote. 37
In time, Washington embraced blacks’ appeals— they not only
mandated that locals implement majority-minority district
systems, federal officials embraced the centrality of racial
discourse in American politics. They eventually used districts to
protect black folks from the continuation of racist political trends
in Southern life. 38 These district systems, by allowing blacks to
elect preferred candidates in ‘safe’ wards, were an attempt to
finally ‘redress present, institutionalized manifestations of
historical injustices against blacks as a group”. 39 These solutions
changed the complexion of Southern city halls and moved
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America toward an unprecedented period of explicitly defined
racial politics. 40
Part I: Systematically Done In

On August 6, 1965, Congress signed what President
Johnson thought was “the goddamnedest, toughest, voting rights
bill” in United States history. 41 The VRA prevented direct
disenfranchisement and sanctioned federal intervention into,
and enforcement over, Southern voting. 42 Section Two of the
VRA suspended discriminatory tests and devices as prerequisites
for voting. 43 Section 4 froze voting laws in states and political
subdivisions with less than 50 percent of the voting age
registered to vote on and/or after November 1, 1964. Section 4
then suspended voting laws and/or election-based changes after
the triggering date. This section also authorized the Department
of Justice (DOJ) to supervise and register voters in covered areas.
Section 5 required preclearance (permission) from federal
officials to change election and registration laws. By 1966,
Washington had deployed nearly 600 federal examiners
throughout nine Southern states including Virginia. 44
The VRA transformed Southern politics. By 1969, nearly
three-fifths of all Southern African American adults were
registered to vote. 45 One year after the VRA’s ratification, black
officeholders and legislators reached approximately 159 and 200
by 1967. 46 Yet, African American voters and candidates met
opposition from whites at nearly every phase of the political and
electoral process. 47 Shortly after the act’s ratification, Southern
whites became increasingly anxious about losing control of city
councils, police forces, municipal courtrooms, and school
boards—the administrative apparatus used to control the colorline. White powerbrokers, who often did the bare minimum to
maintain black communities, realized Southern black politicians

actually wanted more than symbolic political victories and, with
the avalanche of African American registration, had the votes to
realize these ends. 48 In the 1965 article From Protest to Politics,
Bayard Rustin argued that blacks “now sought advances in
employment, housing, school integration, police protection, and
so forth.” 49 Southern jurisdictions met these demands by crafting
a variety of structural barriers that made it harder for blacks to
elect candidates. 50 White powerbrokers combined white and
black districts, relocated polling places to white neighborhoods,
threatened economic reprisals against black voters and
candidates, switched to at-large election systems, and continued
to intimidate voters with violence. In 1968, the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights compiled a 222-page progress report on Southern
black voting. More than half of the report explained the methods
whites devised to maintain control over local politics. 51 Many of
the demands Southern blacks sought to achieve after 1965 had
been on the table in Richmond for years.
Richmond’s case is significant because the city’s African
Americans organized a black electorate prior to the VRA. Black
politics in Richmond had roots in black gradualism and the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s
(NAACP) litigation strategy against segregation. Led by NAACP
lawyers like Oliver W. Hill (who was the first African American
elected Richmond’s city council in 1948) and ministerial
gradualists such as Gordon Blaine Hancock, Richmond’s black
leadership resolved to modulate Jim Crow through interracial
cooperation after World War II. 52 The racial polarization that
followed the Court’s Brown v. Board of Education (1954),
however, ended moderates’ attempts to cautiously improve
segregation. Hill left politics and became integral to the NAACP’s
litigation strategy to integrate public schools. After 1954,
Richmond’s blacks rejected the black gradualists that had
hitched their wagons to white moderates—these white
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moderates, it turned out, signed up with the massive resistance
campaign in the late 1950s. Created by well-heeled NAACP
members, Dr. William Ferguson Reid, Dr. William Thornton, and
Johnny Brooks in 1956, the Crusade believed that the racial
polarization brought on by the Court’s Brown decision called for
more robust political organization. 53 Virginia’s poll tax, enacted
during the Constitutional Convention of 1901-02, not threats of
mob brutality, dictated who voted in the commonwealth. 54 Once
the Crusade realized that winning local elections hinged on a
group’s ability pay others’ poll taxes, African Americans began to
register an unprecedented number of voters. By 1960, the
Crusade’s leadership registered roughly 16,000 African
American voters. 55 The organization’s initial registration efforts
eventually led to Brooks’s appointment as the NAACP’s national
voter registration director. 56 In 1961, the Crusade had registered
so many black voters that the political action director for the
southeast region of the AFL-CIO, Earl Davis asserted, “The
Crusade has the largest group of volunteer workers of any place
that I have ever been.” 57
Richmond’s African Americans were also able to
challenge Jim Crowism through electoral politics because
Virginia’s white powerbrokers, under the auspices of Senator
Harry F. Byrd and his reputed “machine,” maintained segregation
through paternalistic elitism rather than violent rigidity. 58 By the
1950s, Byrd had assumed almost total control over Virginia
politics and his organization’s political power derived from an
elaborate system of patronage, circuit court appointments, and
disenfranchisement. 59 While Byrd and Virginia elites used poll
taxes to divest most African American of their constitutional
rights and preserve Virginia’s place as an elite white man’s
commonwealth, they also maintained white privilege by
practicing a genteel brand of racist paternalism. 60 According to J.
Douglas Smith, “interracial cooperation was always governed

according to terms dictated by whites whose concern stemmed
less from humanitarian obligations toward blacks than from the
desire to do the bare minimum to keeps black happy.” 61
Richmond’s white elites maintained segregation by deemphasizing violence and handing out piecemeal concessions to
black leaders like Hancock. 62 Until the mid-1950s, racially
moderate black and white leaders worked to modulate Jim Crow
rather than abolish it. When it came to black voting, Byrd
Democrats counted on the fact that they could pay lip service to
limited black political participation without conceding
substantive political power. 63 Yet even Byrd understood that if
more blacks paid poll taxes, they might swing the balance of
power in local elections because the levies also suppressed large
white voter turnout. 64 As Richmond’s post-WWII interracialism
disintegrated during massive resistance, the Crusade affirmed
Byrd’s fears— they challenged Virginia’s constricted electorate
by out-organizing white voters.
Black voting in Richmond continued to grow in size and
influence by the early 1960s. The Crusade eventually created a
self-sustaining network of precinct-based clubs throughout the
city’s black neighborhoods. 65 Precinct units, which were
comprised of officers and organizers, elected two delegates to a
board of directors that served on the citywide Crusade. A
research committee selected by the organization’s president
advised the board of directors. The organization, which was
financially independent of white patronage, held block parties to
raise funds for poll taxes, advised voters on when to pay the tax,
and instructed the electorate on how to fill out ballots. Between
1960 and 1964, the Crusade increased the number of registered
black voters from 15,739 to 18, 355. 66 In 1964 Richmond’s black
voters made up roughly 34.5 percent of Richmond’s eligible
voters. 67 The Crusade’s research committee eventually
convinced African Americans to bloc-vote for a slate of nine
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candidates at-large in lieu of throwing the electorate’s muscle
behind one particular candidate (i.e., single-shot voting). 68 The
objective was to place the black community’s support behind
nine of the least disagreeable white candidates. These votes were
meant to indebt white politicians to blacks’ demands and
preclude the election of white candidates that opposed
integration. 69 These balance of power strategies eventually led
city council to pass a fair employment resolution in 1962. 70 Two
years later in 1964, Richmonders elected an African American
real estate agent, B.A. “Sonny” Cephas, to city council. Cephas
garnered 9,835 black votes and 6,677 white votes—he finished
second of twenty-one candidates. 71
By the mid-1960s, Richmond’s black population had not
only grown, African Americans had out-registered and outorganized whites. In 1960, Richmond had a total population of
219, 958. By 1968, the Census Bureau estimated that the capital
city’s population shrank to 216, 451. 72 During that same period,
however, the total number of black Richmonders increased from
92, 331 to 108, 053. In 1966, approximately 30,000 blacks and
58,000 whites (approximately half of Richmond’s white
population) were registered to vote. 73 Between 1964 and 1966,
black registrants increased 65 percent; in the same period, white
registrants increased 13 percent. 74 While the VRA lifted
traditional restrictions to the franchise, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision to abolish poll taxes in state/local elections in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections (1966) significantly influenced
the number of Richmond’s black registrants. 75 In 1966,
Richmond elected two more African American council members,
Henry Marsh, III and Winfred Mundle—and 25,500 African
Americans voted in that election. 76 One year later, the Crusade
contended that their mailing list consisted of roughly 32,000
black voters. 77

Underneath the façade of Richmond’s six-to-three white
majority council, new federal voting rights mandates piqued
whites’ longstanding fears about black governance. Because Byrd
Democrats faced little political opposition, Virginia’s whites were
decidedly unprepared for actual political competition during the
1960s. Although Richmond’s City Charter of 1948 mandated all
city elections to be nonpartisan, Byrd’s “machine” made politics
an endeavor that even few white people participated in (the Byrd
Machine’s demise, in large part due to Byrd’s death in 1966,
heightened the already prevalent anxiety about the state of
interracial politics in the Old Dominion). 78 Of the six white city
councilmembers in 1966, five represented Richmond’s elite
circles. Robert J. Habenicht (attorney), Eleanor Sheppard (selfdescribed housewife of the affluent Ginter Park neighborhood),
Morill M. Crowe (pharmacist), James C. Wheat (VMI graduate,
banker, and president of J.C. Wheat and Co.), and Mayor Phil J.
Bagley (city councilman since 1952) garnered a sizeable number
of their votes from exclusively white enclaves such as
Richmond’s North Side, the West End, and the Fan District. 79
These five council members also belonged to a predominantly
white, nonpartisan political organization called Richmond
Forward. 80 Richmond Forward recognized a considerable change
in city council voting patterns. African Americans made up 43
percent of the vote in 1966. More ominously, whites made up 68
percent of the vote in the city council election of 1964, but only
56 percent of total voters in the election of 1966. 81 White
councilmembers knew that it took five votes (of nine) to pass a
city budget and six votes for special appropriations. Court
testimony later revealed that whites understood very well how
close they were to losing a numerical advantage on city council—
especially if the demographic and political trends continued. 82
These fears expedited the push for annexation.
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In early 1966, the city council majority introduced their
first measure to dilute black votes—a supposedly race-neutral
referendum to stagger local council terms. Several months
before the Warren Court’s abolition of poll taxes in state/local
elections in Harper, white council members Eleanor Sheppard
and James C. Wheat, Jr. recommended a change in the city
charter to replace two-year council terms. Anticipating that the
abolition of poll taxes would dramatically increase the number of
black registrants, the trio planned to manipulate the city’s atlarge election system by rewarding the highest four vote getters
with four-year terms. The five candidates who finished behind
the four winners (presumably black candidates) were to serve
two-year terms. During the next election, the five council seats
up for grabs were to be filled for four-year terms by the top vote
getters and the fifth place candidate would serve a two-year term
(and, so on). Whites maintained that the plan was a color-blind
initiative designed to combine experienced candidates with
newcomers. As it stood, blacks had just enough registrants to
place candidates in the middle or bottom of the top nine votegetters. A Richmond Forward campaign memo to candidates
read, “When explaining the stagger system give a clear, simple
explanation so as to eliminate doubt in the minds of the Negro
public that it was designed and approved solely to keep Negro
candidates from being elected to city council.” 83 The plan not
only represented Richmond’s first attempt to dilute African
American votes, it was an attempt to stack city council with
individuals more agreeable to commandeering portions of a
predominantly white suburb. Voters rejected the proposal. While
58 percent of whites voted in favor of the referendum, an
overwhelming 87 percent of African Americans voted no on the
ballot. 84 In the end, African Americans demonstrated that
without inordinate white support of an initiative, Richmond’s

black community had the electoral muscle to vote down key
policies.
The failed attempt to stagger elections crystallized the
Crusade’s resolve to influence substantive policy. The effort to
manipulate council terms also convinced blacks that whites
would go to great lengths to maintain a council majority. Local
leaders realized that blacks needed more than symbolic electoral
victories. The Crusade doubled their registration efforts in 1968
and presented a fourteen-point list of demands to city council
and the General Assembly of Virginia in 1968. They called for a
moratorium on annexations, the city to “fix time and place” for
voting registration, state-based minimum wage laws, labor union
negotiations for city employees, free textbooks for students, fair
busing plans, and more. Many of these demands were in line with
the claims Rustin put forward in 1965 and virtually all of them
were designed to dismantle the apparatus of white control. 85 In
the wake of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination, the
Crusade endorsed a slate of candidates they called the “Poor
People’s Ticket” in remembrance of King’s Poor People’s
Campaign. 86
In 1968, the Crusade’s agenda amplified whites’ anxieties
about an African American council coup d’état. Richmond’s black
electorate reelected Marsh and two racially moderate whites,
lawyer Attorney Howard Carwile and Reverend Jim Carpenter. 87
Shortly after 1968’s election, these councilmen held a series of
rallies/special council sessions designed to mitigate pervasive
police brutality, procure contracts for black businesses, and
resist urban renewal efforts that planned to build an expressway
directly through black neighborhoods. 88 Many white political
leaders associated these demands with the radicalization of
Richmond’s black communities. After a local race riot following
King’s assassination, state Senator Edward E. Willey passed a
referendum to protect Confederate statues on Monument
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Avenue should blacks attempt to destroy them. 89 Councilman
James Wheat openly avowed that if Richmond were not allowed
to annex, the city would become a ghetto. 90 Court testimony
later showed that Mayor Bagley repeatedly stated, “… niggers
won’t take over this town.” 91
The “Poor People’s Ticket” further motivated local elites
into concerted action to commandeer a surrounding suburb. The
question of expanding Richmond’s boundaries for financial
reasons had been on the table throughout the 1960s. Richmond
had attempted to annex portions of Henrico County in 1962.
Local officials in the early 1960s, however, sought to obtain
vacant land and expand the city’s tax-base. Although a special
annexation court authorized the annexation of 16 square miles of
Henrico County, Richmond’s city council determined that the
cost of the annexation, $55 million, was not in the city’s best
financial interest. 92 These monetary anxieties were not a concern
in the late 1960s. While whites publically maintained that
revenue expansion drove the Chesterfield annexation question,
Bagley, white members of council, and Richmond Forward
resolved to harvest the disproportionately white vote living in
Chesterfield County before the election of 1970. Chesterfield
County’s population stood at nearly 68,000 in the late 1960s. 93
The portion of Chesterfield County that Richmond planned to
annex contained roughly 1500 African American residents. 94
Mayor Bagley and Irvin G. Horner, Chesterfield County
executive secretary, secretively began to iron out a boundary
agreement in 1968. The proposed Horner-Bagley line was to run
across Richmond’s southwestern border. 95 Mayor Bagley held
boundary agreement sessions privately and city council voted to
shut out third parties—despite the fact that 12,000 members of
Chesterfield County, 11 civic organizations, and a number of
corporations filed petitions to stop annexation. 96 Bagley also
barred Carpenter, Carwile, and Marsh from merger talks. In time,

city council voted (6-3) to float city bonds to pay for the
merger—the city agreed to pay Chesterfield’s County’s School
Board costs, proposed a five-year capital improvement program,
absolved Chesterfield’s sewage and water facility debt that the
county owed the City of Richmond (to the tune of $24,190,000),
and paid for a host of other transitional costs. 97 Remaining a
majority-white jurisdiction would not only be expansive—it
would be expensive as well. Yet, at least the revenue would serve
whites under the proposed plan. The annexed area’s 11 schools
were to enroll 8, 017 whites and a mere 206 African Americans.
The median family income in the annexed area was roughly
$4700 per year higher than residents in the city (Chesterfield’s
median family income stood at $12,400, while the median family
income in Richmond was $7,692). 98 Richmond garnered
$19,648,975 in real estate tax the year before annexation: in the
fiscal year of 1970-71, one year following annexation, the city
procured $30,424,500. 99
During the annexation process, the Crusade emerged as
boundary expansion’s most vocal critics in Richmond proper.
The Crusade recognized that white flight during the 1960s had
severely weakened Richmond’s tax base and it spent the better
portion of the late 1960s considering the possibilities for
recapturing lost tax assessments without diluting black votes.
Preston Yancy, a weekly Richmond Afro-American columnist and
head of the Crusade’s merger study commission argued in favor
of a single-member district system that might guarantee some
African American representation on city council if Richmond and
a portion of Chesterfield merged—particularly since decades of
residential segregation had packed African Americans into
almost exclusively black enclaves. The switch to a district-based
system, the Crusade believed, might improve the possibility of
electing black candidates and better approximate blacks’
strength in the general electorate. Blacks could maximize votes
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in precincts heavily concentrated with African Americans. 100
Yancy contended:
…any plan to merge or consolidate Richmond… should
have equitable apportionment and geographic
integrity. This method of district or ward election of
local and also state officials should be employed to
help assure that areas of any merged complex be fairly
represented-- Richmond Afro-American, June 17,
1967. 101

Every candidate on the “Poor People’s Ticket” openly renounced
boundary expansion without overhauling Richmond’s at-large
system.
After Richmond and Chesterfield County officials
privately ironed out an agreement, a state-level, three-judge
court rushed through the annexation decision on July 1, 1969.
Virginia’s statutes specified that cities could only annex
surrounding areas under the authority of specially convened
three-judge annexation courts. The annexation took effect at
midnight on December 31. On January 1, 1970, Chesterfield
ceded 23 square miles and forty-seven thousand new citizens—
ninety-seven percent of the annexed area was comprised of
white residents. 102 Annexation summarily reduced Richmond’s
black population from fifty-two percent to forty-two percent. The
proportion of voting-age African Americans dropped from fortyfive percent to thirty-seven percent. 103 Annexation gutted blacks’
ability to elect a council majority— Marsh was the only black
candidate to win in 1970 under the at-large election system.
Part II: Unscrambling the Egg
On Monday, June 30, 1969, Virginia Judge Earl L. Abbott
rubber-stamped Richmond’s annexation of Chesterfield County.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch’s Bill Sauder observed that as
Abbott read the opinion, he—for the first time during the
annexation trial—seemed noticeably nervous while sipping a
glass of water. 104 Abbott’s uneasiness symbolized growing
concern about the legality of voting related changes.
Annexationists failed to acknowledge the Supreme Court’s Allen
v. State Board of Elections decision four months prior to Abbott’s
verdict. 105 Allen expanded the federal government’s capacity to
intervene in local politics in the case of voting related changes.
Had Abbott applied Allen to the question before him or listened
to the Crusade’s appeals for an overhaul to Richmond’s at-large
system, he surely would have been even more nervous about
Richmond’s failure to seek preclearance. 106
The Supreme Court, in Allen v. State Board of Elections
(1969), obliged African Americans’ pleas to neutralize vote
dilution. 107 Prior to Allen, Section 5’s preclearance clause covered
registration procedures exclusively and the case represented the
first time the high court questioned whether Section 5 should
reach beyond equal access statutes. Allen consisted of four
appeals: three from Mississippi and one from Virginia. In Virginia
and Mississippi, whites used various mechanisms to dilute
blacks’ votes and litigants contended that these changes to
election laws were subject to preclearance. In all four cases,
African Americans made up less than half of the total voting age
population, but could be expected to elect a significant number of
black representatives in ward-by-ward voting. Should Section 5,
federal justices pondered, include electoral policies that made it
more difficult for voters to elect preferred candidates? 108 In Allen
(7-2), the Court contended that procedures like the qualification
of candidates, the switch from elective to appointive offices, and
conversion to at-large from single-member district elections fell
under Section 5. More broadly, Chief Justice Warren held that
Section 5 applied to election laws even if those laws had no
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direct connection to voter registration or casting ballots. 109
Following the court’s lead in Allen the DOJ, now under the Nixon
administration, sent out letters to covered states that they
intended to enforce the VRA’s preclearance clause. 110
When Chief Justice Warren stepped down in the summer
of 1969, President Richard Nixon looked to Warren Burger to
reverse the jurisprudential permissiveness that characterized
Warren’s tenure. Burger’s appointment to the chief justiceship in
the summer of 1969 (and the subsequent appointments of Harry
Blackmun in 1970, Lewis Powell in 1972, and William Rehnquist
in 1972) represented an integral phase in the realization of the
Nixon-Phillips Southern Strategy. 111 Powell was a prominent
Richmond attorney who had played a positive role behind the
scenes in desegregating Richmond’s schools. His presence on the
Court no doubt helped shape the ultimate outcome of the
annexation case. 112 Nixon not only intended to gain political
capital by attacking the previous Court’s latitudinarian approach
to civil and social justice, Burger claimed that he had every
intention to overrule cases like Allen. 113 Burger’s appointment
was also meant to signify a movement toward “judicial
conservatism.” Nixon believed that Burger would advance a type
of constitutional jurisprudence predicated on restraint, which
was exemplified by loyalty to the framers’ original
understanding of the Constitution. 114 Yet, no counterrevolution
to the Warren Court’s “reapportionment revolution” transpired
during the 1970s. The Burger Court further affirmed the
previous
Court’s
penchant
for
permissiveness—they
transformed the franchise from an abstract right to a concrete
measure of power that could not be diluted through majoritarian
manipulation. 115
Arguably, no case had a more profound impact on the
Burger Court’s civil rights legacy and the future possibility of
voting rights litigation than Griggs v. Duke Power Company

(1971). The Burger Court established an equality of results
standard and it deployed a disparate impact analysis in Griggs.116
In Griggs, 14 African Americans claimed that North Carolina’s
Duke Power Company relegated blacks to lower paying labor
jobs before the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The company’s intradepartmental transfer policy required
a high school diploma and a minimum score on two aptitude
exams. Plaintiffs claimed that even though the policy did not
discriminate explicitly on racial grounds, it did so implicitly,
because African Americans had systematically been denied equal
access to high school degrees and the quality of the education
that they had obtained was demonstrably inferior to that of
whites. This, in turn, negatively influenced Duke Power’s
personnel policies toward African Americans.
In March of 1971, the Court found (8-0) that no
relationship existed between the company’s criteria for
advancement and job performance. These policies, though
racially neutral, disparately impacted African Americans and
reinforced disproportionate representation in higher paying
positions. 117 In fact, the Supreme Court posited that the South’s
history of inferior segregated public schools made workplace
competition inherently unfair. Griggs not only employed the
compensatory logic the Warren Court used to claim that
segregated schools negatively affected black school children, the
case also signified the Burger Court’s evolution from an equal
treatment standard to an equal results standard of case law. 118
Prior to Griggs, plaintiffs needed to show discriminatory intent in
things like hiring practices; following Griggs, plaintiffs needed to
demonstrate the inequitable effects in hiring or promotional
practices.
The Supreme Court eventually applied the belief in
“disparate impacts” to voting rights in Perkins v. Matthews
(1971). 119 In 1969, a group of appellants from Canton,
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Mississippi, represented by Armand Derfner (Derfner
represented the Crusade in The City of Richmond v. United
States), sought to enjoin local elections after city officials
changed election rules without preclearance from Washington.
Canton moved polling places from black neighborhoods, annexed
a predominantly white suburb, and switched from a ward-based
system to at-large elections in 1969. A state appeals court
dissolved a district court’s injunction and held that none of
Canton’s changes had “a discriminatory purpose or effect.” 120
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court voted 8 to 1 in
Perkins’s favor and held that Canton should have submitted the
changes for preclearance. 121 All of Canton’s electoral alterations,
the Court argued, diluted blacks’ votes under Section 5. More
specifically, the high court argued that changing boundary lines,
moving polling places, and switching electoral systems
disparately affected African Americans’ ability to elect
candidates of their choice. While African Americans were still
relatively free to partake in the electoral process, Canton’s
political machinations, the Court held, diluted the power derived
from the process.
As the Burger Court defended an equality of electoral
results standard during the early 1970s, African Americans and
Washington elites began to use Section 5 more thoroughly.
Between 1969 and 1974, African American voting rights
advocates inspired the DOJ to lodge 150 objections to Southern
electoral systems. Of these roughly 150 objections, twenty
concerned the switch to at-large election systems, eight grappled
with term staggering, and six dealt directly with annexation. 122
These developments had profound implications for Richmond
politics.
Part III: Strange Bedfellows

In 1971, an African American civic activist named Curtis
J. Holt, Sr. filed a suit against the city citing the authority of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fifteenth Amendment. 123 Holt
alleged that Richmond’s recent annexation of Chesterfield
County purposefully diluted black voting strength and cost him a
seat on city council during the election of 1970. Holt, who lived in
Richmond’s Creighton Court housing projects, eventually
transformed Richmond’s political landscape. 124
Curtis Holt, Sr. had been integral to Richmond’s struggle
for political equality for nearly a decade. Holt assisted the
Crusade’s registration drives during the sixties by organizing
fellow public housing tenants and was a member of Richmond’s
Human Relations Commission. Holt, who failed to crack the top
sixteen vote-getters in the 1970 council election, charged in the
wake of the annexation gambit that boundary expansion diluted
blacks’ voting strength and prohibited a Crusade council
majority. He eventually called for complete de-annexation— the
Crusade failed to support Holt’s claim. The RCV refused to
support de-annexation because they wanted a ward system that
might guarantee a five-to-four black council majority. The
Crusade also recognized that de-annexing portions of
Chesterfield County might compromise Richmond’s dwindling
tax base. The organization’s merger study committee was also
aware of the Court’s recent condemnation of annexations and atlarge elections. After the Court ruled that at-large elections
coupled with annexations diluted minority voting strength in
Perkins, the Crusade believed that they were closer to getting the
district-based system they preferred.
Holt, who lacked resources to support a suit, found
improbable allies. Holt’s first attempt at legal involvement in
Richmond’s annexation case came in the form of a telegram to
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. It was later revealed
during oral arguments in City of Richmond v. United States (1975)
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that Holt asked Douglas to “intercede and prevent the
annexation from taking place on the first of January” 1970. 125
Two years later, Holt filed a class action suit in Richmond’s U.S.
District Court on February 24, 1971. As it happened, a young
white lawyer named W.H.C. “Cabell” Venable, who had a sense
for viable (and, visible) cases, agreed to take Holt’s case pro
bono. 126 Initially, Venable argued that annexation diluted black
votes and subsequently violated Section I of the Fifteenth
Amendment. The two also contended that annexation violated
Holt’s due process rights under Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The suit sought to declare annexation void, nullify
the election of 1970, and declare the present council
unconstitutionally convened.
The idea of repatriating Chesterfield County made for
strange bedfellows. 127 A contingent of white residents, led by the
Chesterfield Civic Association from the annexed area, joined Holt
in an improbable de-annexation alliance. Chesterfield residents
and their civic organization had lodged a series of petitions
against annexation during the late 1960s but Mayor Bagley and
Irvin Horner ignored their appeals. As it happened, they aligned
with Holt after a district court ordered Richmond to speed up
public school integration. 128 Chesterfield residents believed that
repatriating Chesterfield would prevent their kids from being
bused to Richmond’s predominantly black schools. 129 These
suburbanites eventually helped fund Holt’s litigation and put
Richmond on a complicated litigation trajectory that brought the
city face-to-face with the the Supreme Court and the DOJ.
By the early 1970s, the Justice Department emerged as a
vocal critic of Richmond’s annexation of Chesterfield County. 130
Section 10 of the VRA gave the U.S. attorney general the
authority to bring suits against states and political subdivisions
that violated the VRA. After Congress stopped Nixon’s attempt to
repeal Section 5 during the act’s renewal in 1970 (Nixon wanted

to make litigation minorities’ sole recourse for voting related
changes), Mitchell and Nixon believed that attacking Section 5
might win the Republican Party favor with Southerners. 131
Mitchell intended to reorganize the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division so
that the division no longer exclusively covered the South. This
restructuring had the unintended consequence, however, of not
only creating a Voting Rights Section, but concentrating in that
newly created section liberal holdovers from Johnson’s
administration that were committed to enforcing Section 5. 132 By
1975, the Justice Department instigated 45 suits under Section 5
and took part in a host of private suits like Holt’s. 133 These CRD
lawyers and the Supreme Court were instrumental in shaping
the future of Richmond politics.
In 1971, local officials clung nervously to the hope that
Perkins had no jurisprudential application to Richmond’s
annexation. City Attorney Conrad B. Mattox, Jr. contended, “…the
ruling leads me to believe that it would not deal retroactively
with the city’s annexation of…Chesterfield County. I do not
believe that the award will be overturned.” 134 Yet, Mattox wrote
Attorney General John Mitchell concerning the legality of
annexation in light of the Perkins decision. Chief of the CRD and
assistant attorney general, David Norman’s response left little
doubt about the DOJ’s position:
…the Supreme Court recently held…that [c]hanging
boundary lines by annexations …constitutes the
change of a ‘standard, practice, or procedure with the
respect to voting’ within the meaning of Section
five…The Attorney General is obliged under Section
five to be concerned with the voting changes produced
by an annexation…In the circumstances of Richmond,
where representatives are elected at large,
substantially increasing the number of eligible white
votes inevitably tends to dilute the voting strength of
blacks voters. Accordingly, the Attorney General must
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interpose an objection to the voting change, which
results from the annexation. You may, of course, wish
to consider means of accomplishing annexation, which
would avoid producing an impermissible adverse
racial impact on voting, including such techniques as
single-member districts. 135

Beyond turning the tables on the use of “interposition” in a
states’ rights context, Norman’s response to Mattox underlined
deliberations through the 1970s. First, the assistant attorney
general held fast to the Court’s recent rulings on vote dilution. As
far as the Justice Department was concerned, boundary
expansion along with at-large elections diluted black votes. Next,
he suggested that reversing annexation was not the Justice
Department’s major objective as long as Richmond fashioned
single-member districts, a position that paralleled exactly the
Richmond Crusade’s stance on the matter. Norman’s response
confirmed much of black Richmond’s longstanding contention
(Holt notwithstanding) that keeping Chesterfield County was a
viable option as long as policymakers implemented a voting
system that guaranteed black city council seats. Norman also
reflected the Court’s emerging preference for single-member
districts—the Court established in Connor v. Johnson (1971) that
single-member districts were preferable to at-large districts in
court-fashioned reapportionment plans. 136
Holt, however, was driven by a different set of concerns.
Just as city officials were piecing together an acceptable
compromise, Holt’s de-annexation coalition filed its first suit
against the City of Richmond. In September of 1971, U.S. District
Court Judge Robert Merhige concluded that racism and minority
disenfranchisement motivated Richmond’s annexation of
Chesterfield County. 137 Merhige, who had been influenced by
Mayor Bagley’s comments about a black takeover, ruled that
Richmond hold a special council election in September of 1972

based on a seven-two plan; the plan involved an at-large election
of seven candidates from the city and a district-based election of
two candidates from Chesterfield County. 138 City Attorney
Mattox traveled to Washington after Merhige’s decision in
September, but found little sanctuary. In a letter addressed to
Mattox, David Norman wrote:
…in our view, the annexation of a large, almost
exclusively white area does have a discriminatory
racial effect on voting in the context of an emerging
black majority electorate... it is therefore objectionable
under Section 5… 139

The Attorney General’s office not only refused to deviate from its
previous objection, it also rejected a proposal the city drafted for
five white districts and four black districts.
In late 1971, Holt changed litigation strategies and this
led to the suspension of council elections. Venable initially
argued that the addition of large numbers of whites violated
Section I of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process. Venable’s second suit tapped into the
CRD’s recent interpretations of statutory law. He maintained
that Richmond had not acquired the proper authorization from
the Department of Justice for annexation, thus violating the
terms of Section 5. When combined with at-large elections,
Richmond’s new boundaries made it impossible for Holt to win a
council seat. 140 On April 27, 1972, seven of the nine Supreme
Court justices voted to indefinitely postpone Richmond’s May 2
city council election for Section 5 violations. The Court, along
with the Department of Justice, also agreed that the use of atlarge also made it harder for blacks to elect preferred
candidates. 141 Given the momentum encouraged by Holt’s second
case and the DOJ’s refusal to authorize annexation, Richmond
officials had little choice but to file a suit in annexation’s defense.

14
In the meantime, the Supreme Court reaffirmed their
growing preference for mandating single-member districts in a
Petersburg, Virginia case. The city of Petersburg had also
annexed a surrounding territory. 142 Petersburg sought a
declaratory judgment from Washington that annexation did not
deny or abbreviate black electoral strength. The Court found that
the annexation of a majority white area combined with at-large
elections purposefully diminished the possibility of black
representation on city council. 143 A lower court then ruled that
they would approve Petersburg’s annexation if the city devised
districts that returned the electoral clout that blacks had prior to
the annexation. Following Petersburg’s implementation of the
suggested ward-based system, the Department of Justice
approved the annexation.
By the spring of 1973, the Crusade and white
councilmembers were so exhausted by the annexation dilemma
that both groups agreed to amicably resolve the crisis. By the
mid-1970s, three members of Richmond’s city council had
resigned and the council appointed new members without
holding elections. An interracial contingent of councilmen and
local officials began also working on a district plan that the DOJ
might approve. Local officials eventually drafted this plan in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Regester (1973). 144
Although the Court struggled to find a standard for vote dilution,
in White they found that a “presence of factors” often made it less
likely for minority groups in a jurisdiction to elect preferred
candidates. According to Richard Valelly, “…the Court held that
an accumulation of indirect evidence… sufficed to show
discriminatory intent. This became known as the Court’s ‘totality
of circumstances’ test.” 145 Richmond fit the ‘totality of
circumstances test’-- it used at-large elections, had a history of
disenfranchisement, and had annexed portions of Chesterfield
County without preclearance. By 1973, Richmonders had not

only grown increasingly disgruntled over the suspension in
municipal elections, local officials realized that adopting
majority-minority districts was the only means to solve the
annexation predicament. On August 25, 1973, the Justice
Department approved a nine-ward plan that consisted of four
districts with a majority black voting age population (majorityminority districts), four districts with a majority white voting age
population, and one district comprised of equally of whites and
blacks. 146 The Court denied the DOJ’s endorsement because it
had not made a decision in Holt’s de-annexation suit. By late
1974, the city moved to offset Holt II by filing a case defending
the annexation of Chesterfield County.
On April 23, 1975, the Court heard twenty-minute
arguments from Holt’s attorney Cabell Venable, the Crusade’s
representative, Armand Derfner, the Department of Justice, and
attorney Charles S. Rhyne representing Richmond. Venable
argued for full de-annexation, while Derfner and the Crusade
proposed that a ward-based system could offset annexation’s
dilutive aspects. Richmond’s attorney, Charles Rhyne, agreed
with the Crusade. He argued, “An election under the nine ward
plan which we feel is the only fair election where the black
citizen of Richmond will have full representation and
participation in the political process because they are there
guaranteed four seats.” 147 Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, White, and
Rehnquist held “that an annexation reducing the relative political
strength of the minority race in the enlarged city as compared
with what it was before the annexation is not a statutory
violation as long as the post-annexation electoral system fairly
recognizes the minority’s political potential.” 148 During
testimony in Holt I and II, Richmond Forward representatives,
including councilman and future vice-mayor Henry Valentine,
acknowledged that Richmond annexed Chesterfield County to
prevent the election of a black-majority council. 149 All nine
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members of the Court believed that racism motivated
annexation. While the Court upheld Richmond’s annexation of
portions of Chesterfield County, it did so only if the city
implemented the preferred district system. A district court
eventually allowed Richmond to implement four presumably
white and black districts each and a swing district that might
favor either whites or blacks. Given the Court’s decision in
Richmond v. United States, Holt recognized that de-annexation
was impractical after the Court allowed Richmond to keep
Chesterfield under the four-four-swing ward plan. To the chagrin
of Chesterfield residents, Holt abruptly ended his suit.
On March 5, 1977, the Richmond Afro-American’s frontpage headline read “Power to the People.” 150 Four days earlier
three African Americans joined six incumbents (two of which
were black) on city council. In a district system that Henry Marsh
helped design, Richmond elected Mrs. Willie J. Dell, H.W. “Chuck”
Richardson, Walter T. Kenney, Henry L. Marsh, and Claudette
McDaniel. 151 African American candidates ran in every district
except one. Conspicuously absent from the list of victors,
however, was Curtis Holt. Holt, who ran in Marsh’s district
finished last with 687 votes. The Crusade failed to endorse his
candidacy. 152
Richmond’s black majority council embodied the
movement from protest to electoral politics and the culmination
of majority-minority districts. New black council members
included a civil rights lawyer (Marsh), a postal workers union
official (Kenney), two social workers (McDaniel and Dell), and a
28-year-old Vietnam veteran (Richardson) completing a
bachelor’s degree (Richardson’s sister was also married to the
mayor of Atlanta, Maynard Jackson). 153 Among those whites
departing city council after 1977 were the president of a Main
Street brokerage firm, a retired oil company executive, the
president of a prominent real estate firm, the owner of a

successful automobile dealership, a building materials company
executive, and the president of a major funeral home. Although it
took nearly seven years to find a solution to Richmond’s
annexation, the election was a testament to local people and
national officials’ commitment to racial equality.

Conclusion:
Despite the historic election that delivered Richmond’s
first majority black city council, this account is not simply one of
triumph. It is also a cautionary tale about African Americans’
protracted struggle for political parity. During the five years
following the VRA’s ratification, white campaigns to dilute
blacks’ votes grew in size and scope. It took local and federal
officials nearly seven years to devise a solution to Richmond’s
annexation. White resistance to suffrage expansion not only led
to strange bedfellows, post-1965 disenfranchisement once again
fueled an effective black response. Vote dilution mechanisms like
annexations not only helped instigate a voting rights revolution
that changed the meaning of representative democracy in
America, district-based representation changed the racial
equation in Southern electoral politics. By early 1980s,
Richmond witnessed a political complexion revolution—the
capital city laid claim to a black mayor, city manager, school
superintendent, fire chief, treasurer, and a five-to-four black city
council majority. 154 The commonwealth’s capital, during the mid1980s, was one of thirteen United States cities with populations
over 100,000 to be controlled by a solid black council
majority. 155
Leading voting rights scholars agree that the Second
Reconstruction initially succeeded in large part because of
jurisprudential and congressional backing. 156 Bayard Rustin
contended, “But in arriving at a political decision, numbers and
organizations are crucial, especially for the economically
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disenfranchised. Neither that movement nor…black people can
win political power alone. We need allies.” 157 In Richmond,
majority-minority districts led to the election of even more black
officeholders in subsequent decades. 158 African American voters
continue to elect local officials (including Lawrence Douglas
Wilder, who served as mayor between 2005-2009) in proportion
to their voting-age numbers. 159 On one hand, Richmond’s story is
a testament to how local people and federal officials used
disparate impact theories to overcome generations of political
exclusion and institutional discrimination. By the mid-1990s the
federal government made hundreds of Southern cities and statelevel jurisdictions switch to single-member district systems. 160
On the other hand, Richmond’s story reminds us of the
unintended consequences and political abuses that often
accompany American electoral reforms. 161 Recently, we have
seen efforts to roll back not merely racial redistricting, but also
the VRA. 162 Given the Court’s recent decision in Shelby v. Holder
that Section 4 “can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting
jurisdictions to preclearance” and the current proliferation of
electoral impediments like voter identification laws, it is
imperative that we remember America’s long history of cloaking
disenfranchisement in the garb of “good government.” 163
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